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Introduction
In December 2018, the conclusion of a preliminary agreement in
Sweden between Yemen’s warring parties raised hopes of ending the
conflict that has raged there for four years. 2 Commonly known as the
Stockholm Agreement, the deal was signed by Yemen’s internationally
recognized government and the Houthi rebels, a northern faction that
seized control of the capital in 2014. 3 The agreement called for a range
of confidence-building measures aimed at improving humanitarian
conditions and enabling the negotiation of more central issues. 4 Yet
while the media breathlessly hailed the Stockholm Agreement as a
major breakthrough, 5 informed observers cautioned that what was
written on paper might not be easily translated to reality. 6 These
warnings have proven prophetic, as implementation has stagnated at
tragic civilian cost. 7

2.

Peter Salisbury, What Does the Stockholm Agreement Mean for Yemen?,
Wᴀsʜ.
Pᴏsᴛ
(Dec.
21,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/12/21/what-does-the-stockholm-agreement-mean-foryemen/ [https://perma.cc/G2W8-UVT6].

3.

Id.; How Yemen’s Capital Sanaa Was Seized by Houthi Rebels, BBC
(Sept.
27,
2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world29380668 [https://perma.cc/8GN2-E5TQ].

4.

Full Text of the Stockholm Agreement, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF
SECRETARY GENERAL FOR YEMEN
(Dec.
13,
2018),
https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholm-agreement
[https://perma.cc/7EBG-TDA8].

THE

5.

Aziz El Yaakoubi & Johan Sennero, Yemen’s Warring Parties Agree to
Ceasefire in Hodeidah and U.N. Role, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/yemens-warringparties-agree-to-ceasefire-in-hodeidah-and-un-role-idUSKBN1OC0G4
[https://perma.cc/7A3B-5EGY]; Declan Walsh, U.N.-Brokered Hudayda
Truce Is Big Step in Yemen War, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/world/middleeast/yemenceasefire-un.html [https://perma.cc/7FCS-QZZX].

6.

Osama Al-Rawhani, The Good and the Bad in the New Peace Agreement
JAZEERA
(Dec.
19,
2018),
on
Yemen,
AL
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/good-bad-peace-agreementyemen-181218082222574.html [https://perma.cc/SW2L-DR9E]; Peter
Salisbury, Making Yemen’s Hodeida Deal Stick, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-northafrica/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/making-yemens-hodeida-dealstick [https://perma.cc/PBL5-XR9E].

7.

A Quarter Million Yemenis Newly Displaced Six Months Since Stockholm
Ceasefire, NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL (June 11, 2019),
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While hardly the primary cause of its faltering progress to date, the
Stockholm Agreement is not served by its indeterminate status in
international law. 8 Because the Houthis are non-state actors (NSAs),
the agreement does not carry the binding force of international treaties,
which may only be brokered between states. 9 This legal complication
is not unique to Yemen; in fact, the global prevalence of noninternational armed conflict (NIAC) in the modern era 10 has meant that
peace agreements are increasingly being concluded with non-state
armed opposition groups (AOGs) like the Houthis.
Juridically regarded neither as full legal persons nor as legal
nullities, AOGs’ ascension onto the international plane poses a defining
challenge to the classical, Westphalian model of international law.11
The ambiguous position that they occupy in international law has
further cast a pall of uncertainty over the legal status of the agreements
AOGs conclude, such as the Stockholm Agreement. While decidedly
not treaties, it is possible that NIAC peace agreements, armistices, and
ceasefire agreements – which, by definition, include at least one nonstate party 12 – are international contracts of another type.
In Part I, this article begins by commenting upon the practical and
legal consequences of this ambiguous status, including its implications
https://www.nrc.no/news/2019/june/yemen-six-month-since-ceasefire/
[https://perma.cc/3WJS-YCER].
8.

See Haydee Dijkstal, Yemen and the Stockholm Agreement: Background,
Context, and the Significance of the Agreement, Aᴍ. Sᴏᴄɪᴇᴛʏ ᴏF Iɴᴛ’ʟ L.
(May
31,
2019),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/23/issue/5/yemen-and-stockholmagreement-background-context-and-significance [https://perma.cc/568PXYG2] (noting the uncertainty as to what obligations the Agreement
places on non-state actors to the conflict, given their status as non-states).

9.

See id.; International Humanitarian Law, INT’L J. RESOURCE CTR.
https://ijrcenter.org/international-humanitarian-law/
[https://perma.cc/CE3E-3XAM].

10.

Gregory H. Fox, Kristen E. Boon, & Isaac Jenkins, The Contributions of
United Nations Security Council Resolutions to the Law of NonInternational Armed Conflict: New Evidence of Customary International
Law, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 649, 651 (2018).

11.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A
TRANSFORMED
WORLD,
81
(2008),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20P
ubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSW6PRVQ].

12.

See INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED
CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 1 (2008),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armedconflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA2Z-BPVB] (defining a NIAC as an
armed conflict “between governmental forces and non-governmental
armed groups, or between such groups only”).
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for compliance and enforcement, for subsequent legislative and judicial
action, and for the foundations of international law. Part of the
difficulty of NIAC peace agreements are the tradeoffs that their legal
cognizance would entail. While states may at times wish to be able to
hold AOGs to their word, they often do not want to legitimize them as
full international legal actors. This same ambivalence is reflected in a
confused and conflicting judicial treatment of the issue.
Given the muddled state of the law, Part II of this article aims to
elucidate the matter by examining the legal standing of AOGs in
greater detail and under various sources of law. In doing so, it presents
arguments that, in limited contexts, they might possess an international
legal personality that would empower them to enter into treaties or
treaty-like agreements. Even if arguments based on AOG legal
personality are ultimately rejected, Part III illustrates how agreements
between states and AOGs, like the Stockholm Agreement, might still
be considered legally binding through other legal theories. Part IV
closes by relating strategies that the drafters of NIAC peace agreements
have employed in an effort to lend their handiwork a legally binding
flavor.

I.

AOG Treaty-making Power: A Political and Legal
Controversy

In its classical formulation, international law is founded on a
positivist, consent-based paradigm in which legal personality is limited
to states. 13 Exemplifying the state-centric view, the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) defines a treaty as an agreement
between states alone. 14 Nonetheless, it allows in Article 3 that its own
inapplicability to “international agreements concluded between States
and other subjects of international law or between such other subjects
of international law…shall not affect the legal force of such
agreements.” 15 This reservation implies that international law may
recognize agreements between states and NSAs or agreements among
NSAs to the extent that each participating NSA is considered a
“subject[ ] of international law.”

13.

This may also include international organizations whose memberships are
comprised of states. Janne E. Nijman, Non-State Actors and the
International Rule of Law: Revisiting the ‘Realist Theory’ of International
Legal Personality, in NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 91, 111 (Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, eds., 2010).

14.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

15.

Id. at art. 3.
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International legal subjectivity is usually considered synonymous
with international legal personality, 16 or the capacity to hold
international rights and obligations. 17 States are the archetypal legal
persons in international law. 18 There is no consensus, however, as to
the legal personality of entities that share in some, but not all, of the
rights and obligations of states. 19 As it regards the capacity of AOGs
and other NSAs to enter into treaties, this debate is not merely
academic. This section discusses its practical import and reviews the
split in judicial authority on the matter.
A. The Stakes of the Issue

1. The Practical Significance of Legal Recognition: In an anarchic
international system without an enforcement apparatus, why does it
matter if a NIAC peace agreement is technically considered legally
binding? The first reply given by the international law literature is an
empirical one: compliance is statistically more likely when a covenant
has legal effect. 20 The theory underlying this observation is that states
care about their reputations among their peers. 21 The same logic might
apply to AOGs that are repeat players on the international stage and
aspire to state-like capacity.
A second consequence of legal recognition for NIAC peace
agreements is the resultant respect for their terms accorded by other
legal actors. For example, some peace agreements provide for full or
partial amnesty. 22 These clauses will only restrain future prosecution
by domestic courts or international tribunals if found to be legally valid.
Cases concerning the enforceability of amnesty (or non-amnesty)
provisions have in fact been the primary impetus for the limited
international legal scrutiny directed towards NIAC peace agreements.23
2. The Inadequacy of Domestic Law:
Could NIAC peace
agreements instead be subject to domestic law? Unlike international
law, domestic legal regimes have a well-established law enforcement
16.

Nijman, supra note 13, at 93 n.5.

17.

Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors, 42
BROOK. J. OF INT’L. L. 207, 210 207, 210 (2016).

18.

International
Legal
Personality,
Iᴄᴇʟᴀɴᴅɪᴄ
Hᴜᴍ.
Rᴛs. Cᴛʀ.,
http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/humanrights-concepts-ideas-and-fora/human-rights-actors/international-legalpersonality [https://perma.cc/7Y2L-NZU5].

19.

Worster, supra note 17, at 210-211.

20.

Fox et al., supra note 10, at 285; Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their
Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. 373, 384 (2006).

21.

Fox et al., supra note 10; Bell, supra note 19, at 386.

22.

Fox et al., supra note 10, at 675.

23.

See discussion infra Section I.B.
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machinery that typically assures high rates of compliance. 24 But the
state’s monopoly over the domestic legal sphere makes it a
disproportionately powerful and possibly untrustworthy negotiating
party. An AOG signing an agreement with the state would have no
guarantee that the executive would enforce it evenhandedly, the
judiciary would interpret it fairly, and the legislature would not
subsequently undermine or annul it. 25 In addition, the scope of a NIAC
may not be contained within the territorial jurisdiction of just one
state. 26
3. AOGs and Treaty-making Power: Systemic Consequences: The
power to form agreements binding under international law is
conventionally viewed as “an attribute of State sovereignty.” 27
Extending this capacity – even if only partially – to AOGs involved in
NIACs would therefore be a consequential and controversial
development in the field. Proponents nevertheless theorize that it
would improve compliance, based on the reputational theory discussed
above and the status boost that AOGs would gain by acquiring a
competence typically reserved to an elite few. 28
Conversely, states are likely to perceive an elevation in the standing
of AOGs as a concomitant degradation of their own. Implicit in a
state’s binding agreement with an AOG to refrain from hostilities or to
alter political conditions is an admission that it does not have sole
authority over the use of force or the determination of political realities
within its territory. 29 As the “gate-keepers of the system,” states have
jealously guarded against any incremental subsidence of their own
sovereignty that would result from their assent to any concessions to
other actors. 30
24.

Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in
Domestic and International Law, 121 Yᴀʟᴇ L. J. 252, 257–58 (2011).

25.

Ezequiel Heffes & Marcos D. Kotlik, Special Agreements as a Means of
Enhancing Compliance with IHL in Non-International Armed Conflicts:
An Inquiry into the Governing Legal Regime, 96 INT’L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 1195, 1213 (2014).

26.

Id.

27.

S.S. Wimbledon (U.K., Fr., It. & Japan v. Ger.), Majority Opinion, 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, ¶ 35 (Aug. 17).

28.

Bell, supra note 20, at 387.

29.

Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein, Are Agreements between States and NonState Entities Rooted in the International Legal Order?, in THE LAW OF
TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 3, 5 (Enzo Cannizzaro, ed.,
2011).

30.

Jan Klabbers, (I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the
Emergence of Non-State Actors, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 351, 365 (Jarna Petman
& Jan Klabbers, eds., 2003).
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A second set of objections to conferring treaty-making power to
AOGs springs from their unpredictable and sometimes deplorable
behavior. Questions of sovereignty aside, states often shun any form of
engagement with rogue actors that would politically or morally
legitimate them. 31 More concerning from a legal standpoint is the
contention that AOG participation in lawmaking will lead to a
substantive regression in the rules consecrated into international law.32
B. Authoritative Interpretation of NIAC Peace Agreements

The complexity of the political debate over the legal status of
agreements with AOGs is mirrored by a split in the courts. At least
five judicial authorities—four international and one domestic—have in
some form weighed in on the matter, reaching sharply divided
conclusions: one refused to credit the agreement before it; two left the
matter unsettled; and two more honored the subject agreements
without substantively engaging with the question of their legal status.33
The UN Security Council (UNSC), whose resolutions are binding on all
states, has undertaken review of many NIAC peace agreements and
consistently embraced them. 34 This Part reviews these judgments and
resolutions. While it is difficult to conclude much from this fractured
landscape, international law might be said to be weakly trending
toward recognition of NIAC peace agreements.
1. Non-Recognition: The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is
the only court to have methodically assessed the possibility of AOGs
entering into agreements creating binding obligations under
international law. It is also the only court to have rejected such a
possibility outright. In Prosecutor v. Kallon, the SCSL considered
whether an amnesty provision in an agreement between the government
of Sierra Leone and an AOG, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF),
deprived it of criminal jurisdiction. 35 It held that it did not. 36 Unmoved
by the participation of international guarantors in the agreement 37 and
the RUF’s high degree of organization, 38 the Court focused on the lack
31.

Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors:
Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian
Law, 37 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 107, 135–36 (2012).

32.

Id. at 138.

33.

See discussion infra Section I.B.1–3.

34.

Fox et al., supra note 10, at 676–77.

35.

Prosecutor v. Kallon et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision
on Challenge to Jurisdiction, ¶ 88 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Mar.
13, 2004).

36.

Id.

37.

Id. ¶¶ 39–41.

38.

Id. ¶ 48.
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of recognition of the RUF as an independent entity by the community
of nations and by Sierra Leone itself. 39 The SCSL’s conclusion that the
RUF therefore lacked legal personality has drawn criticism from
acclaimed scholars. 40
2. Indeterminacy: Two courts have managed to either avoid the
question of the legal status of agreements involving AOGs or to give
only a partial response. 41 But dissenting opinions and dicta in those
decisions accepting that AOGs have contracting power may offer
valuable insight into the courts’ stances. 42
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)—A year after
the Kallon decision, the legal status of NIAC peace agreements came
before the ICJ in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). 43
The Court
sidestepped the question entirely by determining for other reasons that
the subject ceasefire represented a temporary “modus operandi” rather
than a legally enforceable compact. 44 This approach has been criticized
as “downgrading the legal status of peace agreements” and undermining
their effectiveness by rendering them nonbinding and nonjusticiable. 45
In a separate opinion in the Armed Activities case, Justice
Kooijmans expressed the alternative view that the rebel groups who
39.

Id. ¶ 47 (“[T]here is nothing to show that any other State had granted
the RUF recognition as an entity with which it could enter into legal
relations or that the Government of Sierra Leone regarded it as an entity
other than a faction within Sierra Leone.”).

40.

See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Special Court and International Law: The
Decision Concerning the Lomé Agreement Amnesty, 2 J. OF INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 1130 (2004).

41.

Robarts & Sivakumaran, supra note 31, at 371–72.

42.

See generally, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General ¶¶ 172–174 (Jan. 25,
available
at
2005),
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/com_inq_darfur.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DQR5-UTVU]; Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14,
¶¶ 216–218 (June 27).

43.

See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19, 2005).

44.

Id. at 211(“The [Lusaka] Agreement took as its starting point the realities
on the ground…The arrangements made at Lusaka…were directed at these
factors on the ground…The provisions of the Lusaka Agreement thus
represented an agreed modus operandi for the parties. They stipulated
how the parties should move forward. They did not purport to qualify
the Ugandan military presence in legal terms.”)

45.

Andrej Lang, ‘Modus Operandi’ and the ICJ’s Appraisal of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement in the Armed Activities Case: The Role of Peace
Agreements in International Conflict Resolution, 40 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L.
& POLITICS 107, 132–42 (2008).
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were party to the accord “upgraded” their legal status – that is,
attained legal personality – by signing the agreement. 46 In his view, a
ceasefire agreement cannot alter legal definitions, in this case,
occupation, “in normal circumstances.” 47 But the scope of the subject
agreement extended far beyond the mere cessation of hostilities,
“la[ying] the foundation for the re-establishment of an integrated
Congolese State structure.” 48 The involvement of AOGs in the
statemaking process as “formal participants in the open national
dialogue” signaled their elevation in legal stature.49 According to
Kooijmans, therefore, a NIAC peace agreement takes legal effect when
it amounts to a recognition by the state that its territorial authority is
no longer exclusive. 50
Constitutional Court of Colombia—On the occasion of its
accession in 1995 to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Colombia’s Constitutional
Court engaged in a comprehensive review of the compatibility of that
treaty with its own national constitution. 51 Among the elements that
it considered were the “special agreements” between parties to a NIAC
or other armed conflict referred to in Common Article 3 (discussed in
greater detail below). 52 The Court determined unobjectionably that,
while practically valuable, these covenants are not treaties. 53 It did not
elaborate further on their legal status. 54
From its brief commentary on the subject, it is difficult to discern
the Court’s attitude toward the legality of special agreements. On one
hand, some of its language suggests that AOGs’ legal subjectivity under
IHL forecloses the possibility of a more generalized legal subjectivity

46.

Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. 319–20 (separate opinion of J.
Kooijmans).

47.

Id. at 319.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.

Id. at 320.

51.

Constitutional Review of the “Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)” signed in Geneva 8
June, 1977, and of Law 171 of 16 December, 1994, approving the Protocol,
Case No. C-225/95, ¶ 1 (Constitutional Court of Colombia 1995).

52.

See discussion infra Section II.B.

53.

Constitutional Case No. C-225/95, ¶ 17 (Colom.).

54.

Id.

233

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)

Irregular Forces, Irregular Enforcement
that would enable them to draft contracts. 55 On the other, it touts
special agreements as “politically desirable” and encourages the
government to effectuate them in order to “make the application of
[IHL] more effective.” 56 Two decades later, this ambiguous judicial
stance attained renewed relevance when the 2016 final peace agreement
between the Colombian government and the FARC rebels was
explicitly styled as a “special agreement.” 57
3. Recognition: Though giving scant attention to the issue of legal
personality, two international adjudicative bodies have implicitly
validated the terms of NIAC peace agreements. In addition, the UNSC
has been unambiguous in its acknowledgment of the same.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)—In a 2008
agreement, the government of Sudan and an AOG called the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) agreed to refer their
border dispute regarding the Abyei region to the PCA. 58 In determining
the applicable governing law, the PCA first observed that the
arbitration agreement was not a treaty because it was concluded with
an AOG. 59 Nonetheless, the PCA opted to apply international law,
among other sources, to the agreement based on its reading of the
parties’ intent. 60 Among the indicators that it relied on in reaching this
conclusion were the inherently international nature of border disputes,
the parties’ consent to dispute resolution before an international panel,
and the common understanding that “general principles of law” – a
phrase used in the arbitration agreement’s section on applicable law 61
– include international law in the context of boundary disputes. 62 This
treatment amounts to an implicit acknowledgement that the subject
agreement with the SPLM/A is enforceable in international law.

55.

Id. (commenting that special agreements “are not, strictly speaking,
treaties, as they are not established between entities subject to public
international law but between the parties to an internal conflict, which
are subject to international humanitarian law.”).

56.

Id.

57.

Final Agreement to End Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting
Peace, Colom.-F.A.R.C., preamble, Nov. 14, 2016, available at
http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacionarmas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8V2-9M34].

58.

See Gov’t of Sudan v. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army,
Case No. 2008-07 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), available
at
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/698
[https://perma.cc/G6ZDL2C2].

59.

Id. at 153.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 153–55.

62.

Id.
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR)—As in
the SCSL’s Kallon case, amnesty proved to be a source of controversy
in the IACHR’s Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El
Salvador. 63 This time, however, the situation was reversed: El Salvador
had passed a general amnesty law that directly contravened provisions
in an earlier NIAC peace accord demanding an “end to impunity.”64
Without questioning the legal authority of the peace agreement, the
Court recognized it as a valid legal source in conducting its analysis.65
The Court construed the amnesty law as “contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Peace Accords.” 66 It proceeded to void the law, in part
based on its violation of the principles of the American Convention,67
but also because it “explicitly contradicted” the intent of the parties to
the peace agreement. 68 The Court’s apparent belief that the terms of
the underlying peace agreement are inviolable represents an assumption
that it formed a legally sound contract. 69
UN Security Council and State Practice—UNSC
resolutions frequently communicate the Council’s blessing of NIAC
peace agreements. 70 In their weakest form, these resolutions merely
urge or call on the parties to reach an agreement. 71 Alternatively, the
Council may communicate its approval more directly by welcoming or
endorsing an agreement between the parties. 72 The clearest indication
63.

Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶¶ 2–3 (Oct. 25, 2012).

64.

Id. ¶¶ 284, 287.

65.

Id. ¶ 284.

66.

Id. ¶ 295.

67.

Id. ¶¶ 295–96 (citing articles of the Convention guaranteeing victims the
rights to judicial protection and to a judicial hearing). See also American
Convention on Human Rights, art. 1(1), 8(1), 25, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.123.

68.

Gov’t of Sudan v. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Case
No. 2008-07, ¶ 292 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009).

69.

See id.

70.

Fox et al., supra note 10, at 651–52.

71.

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 924, ¶ 1 (June 1, 1994) (“[c]alls for an immediate
ceasefire [in Yemen]”); S.C. Res 1701, ¶ 9 (Aug. 11, 2006) (“[i]nvites the
Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible
agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the
Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term
solution”); S.C. Res. 2401, ¶ 1 (Feb. 24, 2018) (“[d]emands that all parties
[in Syria] cease hostilities without delay”).

72.

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1464, ¶ 1 (Feb. 4, 2003) (“[e]ndorses the agreement
signed by the Ivorian political forces in Linas-Marcoussis”); S.C. Res.
2307, preamble (Sept. 13, 2016) (“[w]elcoming the Final Agreement for
Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Long Lasting Peace
reached between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary
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that the UNSC considers NIAC peace agreements to be legally binding,
however, are resolutions demanding that the parties comply with
obligations they have assumed through those pacts. 73 One study found
that the Council had ordered AOGs to comply with the terms of their
agreements in 83% of the conflicts in which such agreements existed.74
The UNSC has established monitoring missions to ensure compliance
with these agreements 75 and punished state and AOG violators,
especially through arms embargoes. 76
Though not quite representing either state practice or opinio juris,
the two foundational components of customary international law,
Gregory H. Fox, Kristen E. Boon, and Isaac Jenkins argue convincingly
that UNSC practice in the field of NIAC peace agreements should
nevertheless be understood as evidence of international custom. 77 First,
the UNSC occupies a unique role in peace and security law, with the
Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP)”); S.C. Res. 2451,
¶ 2 (Dec. 21, 2018) (“[e]ndorses the agreements reached by the parties…
as set out in the Stockholm Agreement”).
73.

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 999, ¶ 10 (June 16, 1995) (“[e]mphasizes the absolute
necessity for the parties to comply fully with all the obligations they have
assumed and urges them, in particular, to observe strictly the Agreement
of 17 September 1994”); S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 4 (Nov. 15, 2004) (“[u]rges…
[the parties] immediately to begin resolutely implementing all the
commitments they have made under these agreements”); S.C. Res. 1643,
¶ 2 (Dec. 15, 2005) (“demands that the Forces nouvelles establish without
delay a comprehensive list of armaments in their possession, in accordance
with their obligations”).

74.

Fox et al., supra note 10, at 677.

75.

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 968, ¶ 2 (Dec. 16, 1994) (establishing the United
Nations Mission of Observers in Takijistan (UNMOT) “(a) …to monitor
the implementation of the Agreement of 17 September 1994; [and] (b) [t]o
investigate reports of cease-fire violations”); S.C. Res. 1609, ¶ 3 (June 24,
2005) (including in the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte
d’Ivoire (UNOCI) “[t]o observe and monitor implementation of the joint
declaration of the end of the war…and to investigate violations of the
ceasefire”); S.C. Res. 2452, ¶ 2 (Jan. 16, 2019) (establishing the United
Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) “(b) to
monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire in Hodeidah
governorate and the mutual redeployment of forces”).

76.

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1521, ¶ 2(a) (Dec. 22, 2003) (imposing an arms
embargo against Liberia); S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 6 (Oct. 8, 1997) (imposing an
oil and weapons embargo against Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 6–7
(Nov. 15, 2004) (imposing an arms embargo against the Ivory Coast and
strengthening the UN peacekeeping mission); S.C. Res. 1493, ¶¶ 18, 20
(July 28, 2003) (banning military and financial assistance to armed groups
in the DRC and imposing an arms embargo against all armed groups and
militias operating in certain regions and those not party to a peace
agreement).

77.

Fox et al., supra note 10, at 722–24.
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competencies to legitimize or condemn uses of force, to bind state and
non-state actors alike, and to intervene in domestic affairs (such as
NIACs), including by taking enforcement action. 78 Aggregated data
reveals that the UNSC does in fact frequently involve itself in NIACs
and executes consistent responses. 79 The authors further describe the
UNSC as the appointed agent of UN member states in the domain of
international peace and security, with the practice of the former
therefore attributable to the latter. 80 Finally, six international courts
have acknowledged UNSC practice as contributory to customary
international law. 81 In light of the UNSC’s abiding belief in the
enforceability of NIAC peace agreements, this interpretation strongly
supports their legal legitimacy.
The legal contracting capacity of AOGs bears important
implications for compliance with the agreements they sign and the
restraints those agreements impose upon subsequent legal action.
Recognition of this power may be normatively desirable in order to bind
NSAs to commitments they make in the context of NIACs. But doing
so has the collateral effect of contributing to the erosion of the statebased international legal order. The SCSL stands out for its studied
refusal to permit this leveling of the international system. Globally,
however, judicial and state practice appears to be evolving in a less
ideological direction.

II. The Legal Personality of AOGs
In its famed Reparations for Injuries case, the ICJ took the first
steps toward expanding the concept of legal personality beyond state
boundaries. 82 In that case, the Court explained that various subjects
of international law may differ in their rights and duties according to
“the needs of the community.” 83
Building off of this flexible
prescription, legal personality has evolved toward a functionalist test
dependent upon the manner in which the particular actor participates
in the international system. 84
In the years since the Reparations opinion, the legal standing of
NSAs in the international arena has been clarified only marginally.
78.

See id. at 697–705, 719–21.

79.

See id. at 713–19.

80.

Id. at 707–12.

81.

Id. at 722.

82.

Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11).

83.

Id.

84.

William Thomas Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of
Non-State Actors, 42 BROOK. J. OF INT’L L. 207, 211–12 (2016).
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NSAs clearly do not owe the same obligations as states—international
courts, for instance, have yet to allow for either a civil or criminal case
to proceed against them. 85 Nor do they enjoy the same rights, including
a recognized power to enter into treaties. 86 Nonetheless, there is a
general consensus that certain classes of NSAs, such as international
organizations, 87 national liberation movements, 88 and indigenous
peoples, 89 may attain to at least limited legal personality.
As for AOGs, considerable ambiguity persists as to their legal
status and contracting capacity. The remainder of this Part presents
a case for the contextual legal personality of AOGs drawn from five
different sources of international law: (1) international humanitarian
law (IHL), (2) customary international law (CIL), (3) international
human rights law (IHRL), (4) international criminal law, and (5) the
UN Charter. In an exercise intended to convert legal theory into
pragmatic prescriptions, this Part uses Yemen’s Houthis as a case study
to which these rules may be applied. In doing so, it builds a case for
legally affirming the Stockholm Agreement by ascribing legal
personality to the Houthis under unique sources of international law.

85.

Andrew Clapham, Focusing on Armed Non-State Actors, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 770, 776
(Andrew Clapham et al., eds., 2014).

86.

See Worster, supra note 84, at 235.

87.

International organizations have at least two possible claims to legal
personality. In one sense, they possess a collective legal personality
derived from the individual personality of their member states. This form
of personality is usually understood to be subjective, meaning that it
obtains only with respect to the constituent states. A second form of legal
personality available to international organizations is constructed
functionally. Thus, legal personality is achieved if the organization’s
mandate grants it the capability to undertake meaningful action
independent of its member states. See Worster, supra note 84, at 215-21.

88.

The international right of self-determination lends legal personality to
national liberation movements (NLMs) representing peoples seeking
independence from subjugation. The Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) is a paradigmatic example. Worster, supra note 85, at 222–
24. Based on this right, the ICJ has taken to permitting certain NLMs
to participate in advisory opinions concerning their status. Shana Tabak,
Aspiring States, 64 BᴜFFᴀʟᴏ L. Rᴇᴠ. 499, 547–562 (2016). Unlike most
AOGs, armed conflicts involving NLMs are considered IACs. Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
art. 1(4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.

89.

Indigenous peoples—even those not struggling for independence—may be
parties to international agreements. See Worster, supra note 84, at 224–
29.
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A. International Humanitarian Law

Despite the general rule that treaties do not bind non-parties, the
international community is nearly unanimous in holding AOGs
involved in NIACs to the applicable portions of the Geneva
Conventions. 90 There are several theories justifying this approach.
First, states are recognized as having the power to create obligations
for individuals and groups within their jurisdiction. 91 Second, IHL is
founded on the principle of equality of belligerents in their rights and
obligations. 92 And third, several articles of the Geneva Conventions are
today a part of customary international law. 93
In addition to the imputed applicability of the Geneva Conventions
to AOGs, a few IHL conventions apply to AOGs by their own terms.
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Article 19 of the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict (“Hague Convention of 1954”) both direct each party
to a NIAC “occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties” to abide by certain minimum standards of conduct. 94 The
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) applies in its
entirety to NIAC parties on the same basis. 95
As a party to a NIAC, the Houthis are unquestionably bound by
applicable clauses of the Geneva Conventions and other customary
provisions of IHL. 96 The UN Group of Experts on Yemen confirmed as
much in a 2018 report finding that all parties to the conflict bear
“international humanitarian law obligations aris[ing] under both treaty

90.

Clapham, supra note 85, at 772–75. See also Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 220 (June 27).

91.

Clapham, supra note 85, at 772–73.

92.

Heffes & Kotlik, supra note 25, at 1201.

93.

Clapham, supra note 85, at 774. For a further discussion of customary
IHL, see discussion infra Section II.B.

94.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third
Geneva Convention), art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
art. 19(1), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.

95.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, art. 1(3), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342
U.N.T.S. 137.

96.

Q&A on the Conflict in Yemen and International Law, Hᴜᴍᴀɴ Rɪɢʜᴛs
Wᴀᴛᴄʜ (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/06/qconflict-yemen-and-international-law# [https://perma.cc/V84H-RZT].
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and customary law.” 97 The report went on to document numerous
potential violations of IHL committed by the Houthis, including
shelling civilians, deploying indiscriminate weapons, restricting
humanitarian access, and recruiting children. 98
B. Customary International Law

While the Geneva Conventions and other treaties form the basis of
IHL, much of the corpus is customary. 99 In 1995, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) established that the
customary rules of IHL apply in NIAC settings. 100 They will therefore
bind AOGs involved in a NIAC, provided that they survive a two-part
inquiry. 101 First, the altercation must attain a sufficient scale and
intensity so as to qualify as an “armed conflict” in the first place.102
Scale and intensity are measured according to factors such as:
the number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations;
the type of weapons and other military equipment used; the
number and calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and
type of forces partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties;
the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians
fleeing combat zones. 103

The Yemen conflict, in which confrontations regularly involve
advanced weaponry, have taken an acute humanitarian toll, and have
been ongoing for several years, clearly fits these criteria. 104
97.

U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Situation of Human rights in
Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014, ¶ 15,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/43 (Aug. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Situation of Human
Rights in Yemen].

98.

Id. ¶¶ 41–45, 60–64, 95–99.

99.

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).

100. See id. ¶¶ 96–127.
101. Iɴᴛ’ʟ Cᴏᴍᴍ’ɴ ᴏғ Jᴜʀɪsᴛs, Bᴇᴀʀɪɴɢ ᴛʜᴇ Bʀᴜɴᴛ ᴏF ᴛʜᴇ Wᴀʀ ɪɴ Yᴇᴍᴇɴ:
Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Lᴀᴡ Vɪᴏʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴs ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇɪʀ Iᴍᴘᴀᴄᴛ ᴏɴ ᴛʜᴇ Cɪᴠɪʟɪᴀɴ Pᴏᴘᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ
5 (July 2018), http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/YemenWar-impact-on-populations-Advocacy-Analysis-Brief-2018-ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GE6Z-NSQW].
102. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-l, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 66–70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
103. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).
104. Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, supra note 97, ¶ 15; Iɴᴛ’ʟ Cᴏᴍᴍ’ɴ
ᴏғ Jᴜʀɪsᴛs, supra note 101, at 5–6; Non-International Armed Conflicts in
Yemen, Gᴇɴᴇᴠᴀ Aᴄᴀᴅ. Rᴜʟᴇ ᴏғ Lᴀᴡ ɪɴ Aʀᴍᴇᴅ Cᴏɴғʟɪᴄᴛs, (May 14, 2019),
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Second, the AOG must itself “have reached a certain threshold of
organization, stability, and effective control of territory” in order to
bear customary obligations. 105 This standard is judged according to
indicators including:
the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and
mechanisms within the group; the existence of a headquarters;
the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of
the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment,
recruits, and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate, and
carry out military operations, including troop movements and
logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use
military tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and
negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace
accords. 106

The Houthis quite clearly meet this qualification, too. They operate
according to a regimented organizational hierarchy, control significant
territory, have demonstrated an ability to carry out intricate attacks
and military operations, and have participated in peace negotiations
and concluded agreements. 107 Accordingly, the UN Group of Experts
unequivocally declared the Houthis to be bound by customary IHL. 108
Outside of the context of a NIAC, AOGs may be subject to other
elements of CIL. In its Alien Tort Statute (ATS) jurisprudence, the
United States has led the way in imposing civil liability on NSAs for
violations of customary international norms.109 While the non-state
defendants in these cases have most often been either individuals or
corporations, 110 a not insignificant number of ATS cases have been
http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armedconflicts-in-yemen#collapse1accord [https://perma.cc/2V3X-J3J7].
105. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral,
¶
172
(Jan.
25,
2005),
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/com_inq_darfur.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96PN-Z3PM].
106. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-84-T, ¶ 60.
107. See Sama’a Al-Hamdani, Understanding the Houthi Faction in Yemen,
Lᴀᴡғᴀʀᴇ
(Apr.
7,
2019,
10:00
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-houthi-faction-yemen
[https://perma.cc/EL7V-WGLH].
108. Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, supra note 97, ¶ 15.
109. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–42 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing for
the first time that a NSA can be held civilly liable for violating CIL).
110. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2012); Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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brought against AOGs and terrorist organizations, albeit without much
success. 111
In addition to being conditionally constrained by CIL, it is worth
noting as concerns the legal personality of AOGs that there is some
support for the proposition that they can contribute to that body of
law as well. 112 The ICTY, for one, has cited AOG practice as evidence
of international custom. 113 Some scholars have even promoted the
recognition of a sui generis category of IHL drawn from AOG
conduct. 114 Most authorities, however, do not assign to AOGs a role in
the creation of CIL. 115
C. International Human Rights Law

As the preeminent repositories of legislative, judicial, and executive
functions, states are the primary objects of IHRL. 116 Indeed, very few
human rights treaties address NSAs at all. 117 Instead, IHRL’s
“responsibility to protect” doctrine places the onus upon the state to
prevent abuses committed by AOGs. 118
Despite their omission from its foundational conventions, AOGs are
not entirely exempt from IHRL obligations. At minimum, they are
111. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (stating claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization,
among others); Rosenberg v. Lashkar-E-Taiba, 980 F.Supp.2d 336
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); Mwani v. Al Qaeda, No. 99-125(JMF), 2014 WL
4749182 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2014).
112. Worster, supra note 17, at 236.
113. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 102–08 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
114. See Sophie Rondeau, Participation of Armed Groups in the Development
of the Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts, 93 INT’L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 649 (2011); Marco Sassòli, Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways
to Improve Their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, 1 J.
INT’L HUMAN. LEGAL STUD. 5 (2010).
115. Worster, supra note 17, at 237–38.
116. See Jost Delbruck, International Protection of Human Rights and State
Sovereignty, 57 Iɴᴅ. L. J. 567, 567–68 (1982).
117. But see the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, art. 4(1), May
25, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1285, and the African Union Convention for the
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, art.
7, Oct. 23, 2009, 52 I.L.M. 397 [hereinafter Kampala Convention], as
notable exceptions.
118. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT
17
(2001),
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6T9M-34PW].

242

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)

Irregular Forces, Irregular Enforcement
compelled to observe peremptory norms (jus cogens), 119 including the
protections of the rights to life, freedom of thought, and human dignity
and the prohibitions of torture, slavery, and forced abduction. 120 They
have a further duty to avoid complicity in a state’s human rights
violations. 121
The UN Human Rights Council (HRC), among others, has staked
out the more innovative position that IHRL applies not to state
governments but to state territories, regardless of the authority that
controls them. 122 Thus, AOGs that evolve into de facto regimes will be
considered bound by the IHRL applicable to the region. 123 Relying
upon this understanding, the HRC, UNSC, and various UN
commissions of inquiry have repeatedly condemned the human rights
violations of AOGs that assume territorial dominance. 124
In addition to their jus cogens obligations, the Houthis constitute
an archetypical de facto regime to which the whole of IHRL may be
applicable. Since overtaking Sana’a in 2014, they have exercised
durable control over a large territory and population and erected a
functioning bureaucratic and law-enforcement machinery. 125 The UN
Group of Experts apparently accepted this premise, applying the term
“de facto authorities” to refer to the Houthis and declaring them bound
by IHRL “given their exercise of government-like functions in the areas

119. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/19/69, at 20 (Feb. 22, 2012).
120. See International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights,
General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations During a State of
Emergency, ¶ 7, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).
121. Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct
of Non-State Actors, 11 BUFFALO HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21, 36–39 (2005).
122. Id. at 40.
123. Id. at 39–41.
124. Clapham, supra note 85, at 793–802.
125. See Yemen’s War: Four Years On, What Houthi Rule Looks Like, Aʟ
(Mar.
26,
2019),
ᴊᴀᴢᴇᴇʀᴀ
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/yemen-war-years-houthi-rule190323080134193.html [https://perma.cc/8JE7-2GQX].
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they effectively control.” 126 Other watchdogs have relied on the same
theory in accusing the Houthis of a litany of human rights violations.127
D. International Criminal Law

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
confines personal jurisdiction to “natural persons,” 128 a model largely
adopted by regional criminal tribunals as well. 129 While AOGs therefore
cannot be tried collectively, their individual members are frequently the
targets of international prosecutions for war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity. 130 Liability for the latter requires that an
attack have been committed “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State
or organizational policy.” 131 The ICC has ruled that AOGs—even those
that have relatively few state-like qualities—are sufficiently
sophisticated to promulgate organizational policies that satisfy this
condition. 132
While it did not discuss crimes against humanity, the UN Group of
Experts implicated individual members of the Houthis in potential war
crimes including cruel treatment and torture, outrages upon personal

126. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in
Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014, ¶ 12,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC42/17 (Aug. 9, 2019). See also U.N. High Comm’r for
Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including
Violations and Abuses Since September 2014, ¶¶ 5, 107, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/39/43 (Aug. 17, 2018).
127. Mwatana for Human Rights et al., Submission to the UN Universal
Periodic
Review
4–5
(Jan.
2019),
https://www.uprinfo.org/sites/default/files/document/yemen/session_32__january_2019/js5_upr32_yem_e_main.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KXFWLT8]; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Human Rights and Democracy:
The 2017 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-anddemocracy-report-2017/human-rights-and-democracy-the-2017-foreignand-commonwealth-office-report#chapter-5-human-rights-prioritycountries [https://perma.cc/YM62-M7J6].
128. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. art 25(1), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
129. Caroline Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability under
International Criminal Law, 49 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 371 (2016).
130. Clapham, supra note 85, at 805–06.
131. Rome Statute, supra note 128, art. 7(2)(a).
132. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶ 90 (Mar. 31,
2010).
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dignity, and child enlistment. 133 Human rights groups have added to
this list, demanding that Houthi fighters be held to account for
targeting civilian objects, planting antipersonnel mines, and using
human shields. 134
E. UN Charter and the Use of Force

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits members from engaging in
“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other matter inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.” 135 A state may waive this privilege
by consenting to a foreign actor’s use of force. 136 However, its ability
to do so may be constrained by its effective control over territory within
its borders. 137 When a state forfeits enough control to a rival within its
sovereign borders, some authorities have even extended Article 2(4)
protection to the de facto regime that emerge, such as Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, 138 Taiwan, 139 and pre-independence South Korea. 140 It is not
uncommon for AOGs to attain to similar levels of effective control,

133. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Situation of Human rights in
Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014, ¶ 108(c),
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/43 (Aug. 17, 2018).
134. Yemen: Attack on Saudi Airport Apparent War Crime, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH
(June
14,
2019,
2:00
PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/14/yemen-attack-saudi-airportapparent-war-crime
[https://perma.cc/H475-SFA7];
Yemen:
Key
Concerns for Hodeida Battle, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 15, 2018,
12:00
AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/15/yemen-keyconcerns-hodeida-battle [https://perma.cc/ZB4N-BMM6].
135. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
136. International Law Commission, Responsibility of
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 20 (Dec. 12, 2001).

States

for

137. Zachary Vermeer, The Jus Ad Bellum and the Airstrikes in Yemen:
Double Standards for Decamping Presidents? EJIL: Tᴀʟᴋ! (Apr. 30,
2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-jus-ad-bellum-and-the-airstrikes-inyemen-double-standards-for-decamping-presidents/
[https://perma.cc/8GDG-5837].
138. See INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION
CONFLICT
IN
GEORGIA
REPORT
VOL.
II,
39–43
http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_II1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4253-LAF6].

ON

THE

(2009),

139. Worster, supra note 17, at 240(citing James Crawford, THE CREATION OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (2006)).
140. Id. (citing JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES
INTERNATIONAL LAW 470 (2006)); S.C. Res. 82 (June 25, 1950).
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political organization, and popular legitimacy 141 that would seem to
entitle them to the same security guarantee under the Charter. 142
As a UN member, Yemen is a beneficiary of the Article 2(4) nonintervention clause. But its president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi,
arguably waived this right when he petitioned the UNSC and the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) for military assistance in 2015. 143 On the
other hand, some scholars have questioned whether Hadi had the legal
capacity to authorize such action due to the Yemeni state’s lack of
effective control over the Houthi-dominated north. 144 Judged by their
territorial dominion, governance architecture, and military prowess, the
Houthis are as much a de facto state as any other, and therefore may
themselves be entitled to claim Article 2(4) as a shield against foreign
uses of force. 145
Just as they may benefit from the UN Charter’s embrace of
territorial sovereignty in Article 2(4), AOGs may be subject to its selfdefense exception. In Article 51, the Charter preserves UN members’
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” against “armed
attack.” 146 Thus, if AOGs enjoy the Article 2(4) protection against
foreign uses of force, then they may forfeit that privilege by mounting
an “armed attack” against another state.

141. Scott Pegg, De Facto States in the International System 1–2, (Inst. of
Int’l Relations, Univ. of B.C., Working Paper No. 21, 1998).
142. See Jonte van Essen, De Facto Regimes in International Law, 28 Uᴛʀᴇᴄʜᴛ
J. ᴏF Iɴᴛ’ʟ & Eᴜʀ. L. 31, 37 (2012).
143. Michelle Nichols, Yemen Asks U.N. to Back Military Action by “Willing
(Mar.
24,
2015,
6:03
PM),
Countries”,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un/yemen-asks-u-nto-back-military-action-by-willing-countriesidUSKBN0MK2OP20150324
[https://perma.cc/R949-N7DD]; GCC
Statement: Gulf Countries Response to Letter from Yemen President,
THE NATIONAL (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.thenational.ae/uae/gccstatement-gulf-countries-response-to-letter-from-yemen-president-1.4831
[https://perma.cc/73UD-UT2X].
144. Vermeer, supra note 139; Robert Chesney, U.S. Support for the Saudi Air
Campaign in Yemen: The Legal Issues, LAWFARE (Apr. 15, 2015, 3:02
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-support-saudi-air-campaignyemen-legal-issues [https://perma.cc/Y68C-KFC5].
145. See Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and
Abuses Since September 2014, supra note 128; Ben Watson, The War in
Yemen and the Making of a Chaos State, Tʜᴇ Aᴛʟᴀɴᴛɪᴄ (Feb. 3, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/the-war-inyemen-and-the-making-of-a-chaos-state/551987/
[https://perma.cc/L7Q4-4WH6].
146. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
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The ICJ has confined the Article 51 right to self-defense to attacks
committed by or attributable to other states. 147 After all, to permit
defensive force against an AOG operating from within a host state
would seem to violate the host’s sovereignty under Article 2(4). 148 The
UNSC, however, has apparently adopted a different interpretation.149
In two resolutions issued in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks,
it referenced the Charter’s right of self-defense as a basis for
counterterrorism operations, 150 indicating its belief that AOGs can
activate Article 51 151. It might follow from this assessment that reprisal
actions taken against an AOG launching an “armed attack” are not
considered intrusions upon the sovereignty of their host state,
suggesting that the offending AOG possesses some independent legal
status.
Relying on President Hadi’s invitation in order to avoid the matter
of their interference with Yemeni sovereignty, various parties to the
Yemen conflict have likewise interpreted Houthi aggression as sufficient
cause to prompt defensive action. 152 The Saudis continue to base their
military presence in Yemen on the principle of self-defense,
characterizing their fight against the Houthis as “essential to the
national security of Saudi Arabia and other GCC nations.” 153 In a 2018
letter to Congress, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis supported
this position, describing the Saudi-led coalition’s operations as a
“legitimate exercise of self-defense.” 154 In 2016, the U.S. again claimed

147. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 195. See also Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 146; Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶
139 (July 9).
148. Kenneth Anderson, Readings: Can Non-State Actors Mount an Armed
Attack? by Kimberly N. Trapp LAWFARE (June 11, 2014, 3:29 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/readings-can-non-state-actors-mountarmed-attack-kimberly-n-trapp [https://perma.cc/VZY4-8F75].
149. See S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, (Sept. 28, 2001).
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See Mɪɴɪsᴛʀʏ ᴏF Fᴏʀᴇɪɢɴ AFFᴀɪʀs, Sᴀᴜᴅɪ Aʀᴀʙɪᴀ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Yᴇᴍᴇɴ CᴏɴFʟɪᴄᴛ 27
(2017).
153. Id. at 7.
154. Letter from James Mattis, U.S. Secretary of Defense, to Mitchell
McConnell, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Mar. 14, 2018),
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/defense-secretaryjim-mattiss-letter-to-congressional-leaders/2837/
[https://perma.cc/6AJ5-529C].
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self-defense to support its own use of force against the Houthis after
they fired on Navy ships. 155
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that AOGs may, and that the
Houthis in fact do, bear rights and obligations under a wide range of
sources of international law. During a NIAC, AOGs are on equal
footing with states under IHL conventions and are further held to jus
cogens norms. 156
When they attain sufficient organizational
sophistication or assume effective control over territory, they are
subject to customary IHL and, arguably, IHRL. And while they cannot
be prosecuted organizationally, their constituents have become some of
the primary targets of hybrid courts and international criminal
tribunals. Lastly, AOGs with a state-like control over territory may be
protected by the UN Charter from state acts of aggression, while
simultaneously capable of triggering another state’s right of self-defense
through offensives of their own.
Considered in aggregate, this evidence overwhelmingly confirms
that AOGs are endowed with legal personality in many different
contexts. There is therefore a strong case that they should be
considered “subjects of international law” under the terms of the
VCLT, implicitly capable of striking deals with “legal force.”157
Recognition of their contracting capacity might promote more effective
implementation of the Stockholm Agreement and other NIAC peace
agreements.

III. NIAC Peace Agreements as International
Instruments
While hardly a radical concept, the argument presented in the
preceding section that AOGs possess some form of treaty-making power
remains debatable. Fortunately, parties seeking to enforce NIAC peace
agreements under international law need not resort to a legal construct
as consequential as AOG legal personality. 158 Instead, there are several
existing doctrines in international law under which the Stockholm
155. Oona A. Hathaway et al., Yemen: Is the U.S. Breaking the Law? 10 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 61 (2019).
156. See Situation of Human rights in Yemen, supra note 126.
157. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 3, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
158. See Gov’t of Sudan v. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army,
Case No. 2008-07, ¶¶ 401, 430 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), available at
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/698
[https://perma.cc/G6ZDL2C2] (explaining that although a party to the arbitration agreement was
an AOG, the arbitration agreement would still be enforceable under
international law); see also Fox et al., supra note 10, at 698–99 (explaining
that the Security Council has the unique authority to bind non-state
actors).
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Agreement (and others like it) might be considered binding on the
parties. These include (1) its endorsement by the UNSC, (2) its
potential status as a special agreement, and (3) potential Houthi (or
other AOG) statehood under the Montevideo Convention. 159
A.

UNSC Endorsement

As described above, the UNSC frequently stamps its approval on
NIAC peace agreements through a ratifying resolution, which may be
followed by an order to comply and enforcement action. 160 In Yemen,
the UNSC announced its endorsement of the Stockholm Agreement in
a resolution published a week after the negotiations concluded. 161 The
resolution called for full respect of the terms of the agreement by the
“parties” and requested reports on the progress of its implementation.162
The UNSC further signaled its commitment to the deal by establishing
a UN political mission to monitor and support its implementation. 163
A UNSC resolution of this type may convert an otherwise nonbinding understanding into a binding set of commitments. At
minimum, UNSC resolutions are binding on UN member states, which,
by acceding to the UN Charter, have consented to “accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council.” 164 State obligations to the
UNSC are unaffected by their membership on the Council or their
opposition to its actions. 165
The legal effect of UNSC resolutions with respect to AOGs is less
clear. The classical view, expressed in a 1971 ICJ decision, is that, in
keeping with the law of treaties, the UNSC may not bind non-parties
to the UN Charter, such as non-states. 166 The quasi-constitutional
status that the UN Charter now enjoys within the international

159. See Fox et al., supra note 10, at 698–99 (explaining that the Security
Council has the unique authority to bind non-state actors); see also
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third
Geneva Convention), art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
art. 19(2), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215; Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 12, 1933, 165 U.N.T.S. 21.
160. See supra Section I.B.3.
161. S.C. Res. 2451, ¶ 2 (Dec. 21, 2018).
162. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7.
163. S.C. Res. 2452, ¶¶ 1–2 (Jan. 16, 2019).
164. U.N. Charter, art. 25.
165. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 116 (June
21).
166. Id. ¶ 126.
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community casts doubt on that literalist interpretation. 167 Moreover,
the UNSC now presumes the authority to directly regulate the behavior
of individuals, international organizations, and AOGs. 168 This trend
has been most conspicuous in its pronouncements on terrorism,
including demands that terrorist groups disarm and cease terrorist
activity. 169 In 2019, the UNSC issued a general resolution on the issue
of persons reported missing during armed conflict that was addressed
to “all parties to armed conflict,” states and non-states alike. 170 And
in the early days of the current iteration of the Yemeni conflict, the
UNSC ordered the Houthis to withdraw from Sana’a, partially disarm
and demilitarize, and cease child recruitment. 171
A 2010 ICJ advisory opinion implicitly approved of this UNSC
practice in the context of NIACs. 172 In that case, the Court considered
whether UNSC Resolution 1244, which demanded that the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) and other AOGs cease hostilities and
demilitarize, 173 precluded the Kosovo Albanian political leadership from
subsequently declaring independence. 174 In doing so, it compared
Resolution 1244 to a series of other UNSC resolutions addressing the
Kosovo Albanian leadership directly, illustrating that Resolution 1244
was directed only toward the KLA and not toward the political
authorities. 175 The Court gave no indication of disfavor for the
Council’s general practice of issuing directives to NSAs and impliedly
acknowledged its ability to impose binding obligations upon AOGs,
including by endorsement of the agreements they sign. 176
167. Vincent-Joel Proulx, International Civil Individual Responsibility and the
Security Council: Building the Foundations of a General Regime, 40
MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 215, 251 (2019).
168. Id. at 251–53.
169. S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 4 (Aug. 15, 2014); S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 1 (Sept. 24, 2014).
170. The applicability of this resolution to AOGs may be inferred from its
imposition of obligations upon states specifically along with the broader
category of “parties to armed conflict.” S.C. Res. 2474, ¶ 15 (June 11,
2019).
171. S.C. Res. 2216, ¶ 1 (Apr. 14, 2015).
172. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403,
450 (July 22).
173. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 15 (June 10, 1999).
174. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, supra note 172, at 449-50.
175. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, supra note 172, at 450-50.
176. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, supra note 172, at 450.
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B.

Special Agreement

Beyond the minimum duties that they impose upon AOGs, the
Geneva Conventions and the Hague Convention of 1954 both encourage
the parties of a NIAC to voluntarily commit to their remaining
provisions by concluding “special agreements.” 177 The scope of these
agreements may even extend beyond the express demands of the
Conventions, encompassing customary IHL rules, specific weapons
bans, or IHRL to the extent that it overlaps with IHL. 178 Articles of a
general peace agreement or ceasefire concerning IHL may be considered
special agreements that may enter into force should hostilities
continue. 179 Similarly, a special agreement may come in the form of a
unilateral declaration, such as military codes of conduct or the “Deeds
of Commitment” that many AOGs have undertaken in response to the
Geneva Call’s initiative to eliminate landmines. 180
To avoid confusion with treaties, both the Geneva Conventions and
the Hague Convention of 1954 caution that special agreements do not
affect the legal status of the negotiating parties. 181 Neither instrument
specifies the body of law intended to govern such agreements, leaving
their position in international law unclear. 182 Nonetheless, they offer
states and AOGs another mechanism through which to undertake
reciprocal commitments. 183
The most prominent special agreement in recent history was the
2016 comprehensive compact signed by the government of Colombia
177. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Third Geneva Convention), supra note 159, at art. 3; Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, supra
note 159, at art. 19(2).
178. International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the First
Geneva
Convention,
¶¶
846,
851
(2016),
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocume
nt&documentId=59F6CDFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC#_Toc4651
69951 [https://perma.cc/7MRX-FKKH].
179. Id. ¶ 850.
180. Id. ¶¶ 856–58; Clapham, supra note 85, at 783–85, 802–04.
181. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Third Geneva Convention), supra note 159, at art. 3; Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, supra
note 159, at art. 19(4).
182. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War (Third Geneva Convention), supra note 159; Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, supra
note 159.
183. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Third Geneva Convention), supra note 159, at art. 6; Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, supra
note 159, at art. 19(2).
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and the FARC rebels. 184 The agreement itself states that it is a “Special
Agreement pursuant to Article 3, common to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.” 185 With chapters dedicated to social, economic, political,
and security reform, 186 the expansive scope of the agreement illustrates
Colombia’s belief that special agreements can extend beyond the realm
of IHL.
Although Colombia’s agreement is the most recent example of
committing parties to adhere to the Geneva Conventions, it is not the
only one. A special agreement, entitled, The Protocol on the
Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur, signed on April
8, 2004, by the Government of the Sudan with two AOGs, the Sudanese
Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, stated
as follows:
The concept and execution of the humanitarian assistance in
Darfur will be conform [sic] to the international principles with a
view to guarantee that it will be credible, transparent and
inclusive, notably: the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its two 1977
Additional Protocols; the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, the 1966 International Convention [sic] on Civil and
Public [sic] Rights, the 1952 Geneva Convention on Refugees [sic],
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Deng
Principles) and the provisions of General Assembly resolution
46/182. 187

And even earlier, in 1992, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
entered into an agreement with four NSAs to not only abide by Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions but to also undertake a “Special
Agreement” to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions that
would otherwise only apply to international – not internal – armed
conflicts. 188
184. See Final Agreement To End The Armed Conflict And Build A Stable
And Lasting Peace, supra note 57, at 5 (“The National Government and
the FARC-EP agree that the Final Agreement to end the conflict and
build a stable and lasting peace shall be signed as a special agreement
under the terms of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.”).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 6.
187. Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur,
Preamble
(Sudan
2004),
available
at
https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-protocol-establishmenthumanitarian-assistance-darfur [https://perma.cc/276Z-LZ2G].
188. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Agreement No. 1 of May 22, 1992 arts. 1-2,
https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/former-yugoslavia-specialagreements-between-parties-conflicts#toc-b-bosnia-and-herzegovinaagreement-no-1-of-may-22-1992 [https://perma.cc/QJ87-3GVU].
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Portions of the Stockholm Agreement that touch on IHL—such as
provisions instituting a ceasefire, calling for the withdrawal of military
forces and for demining operations, and demanding the protection of
civilian freedom of movement and humanitarian access—could arguably
be classified as a special agreement. 189 That argument would be
stronger if it were explicitly fashioned as such or if it cited specific
protections in the Geneva Conventions as applicable.
C.

The Montevideo Convention

The cumulative proof compiled in Part II notwithstanding, the
clearest pathway to legal personality and treaty-making power for an
AOG is its ascendance to statehood. While strictly limiting its scope
to compacts signed between states, the VCLT does not itself define the
term “state.” 190 The authoritative international text on that subject is
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
(“Montevideo Convention”), which enumerates four attributes of
statehood for the purposes of international law: “(a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to
enter into relations with the other states.” 191 Reading the Montevideo
Convention and the VCLT together, therefore, suggests that a treaty
may be formed by any entity that satisfies these criteria.
Many NSAs arguably do fit these guidelines. Some have even won
judicial recognition of their statehood. For instance, in 1995 the United
States’ Second Circuit acknowledged the self-proclaimed Republic of
Srpska as a state through an application of the Montevideo principles.192
Based on this precedent, similarly situated NSAs might have a
compelling case for the same legal treatment. But they may encounter
an obstacle in their lack of recognition by other states.
189. Full Text of the Stockholm Agreement, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF
THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR YEMEN (Dec. 13, 2018), available at
https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholm-agreement
[https://perma.cc/FP8X-99GH].
190. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 1–2, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
191. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, supra note
159, at art. 1.
192. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995). U.S. courts have
continually rejected granting the same recognition to Palestine or the
PLO, however. See, e.g., Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 402
F.3d 274, 288–92 (1st Cir. 2005); Knox v. Palestine Liberation
Organization, 306 F.Supp.2d 424, 433–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Doe v.
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 993 F. Supp. 3, 9 (D.D.C. 1998), the D.C.
District Court concluded that further facts were required to determine
whether an Algerian political group qualified as a “de facto state” under
Montevideo.
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The Montevideo Convention declares that statehood is
“independent of recognition by the other states,” 193 a proposition known
as the “declaratory theory.” 194 While the declaratory theory represents
the dominant view, it is not the consensus opinion. 195 According to the
competing “constitutive theory,” statehood is premised entirely upon
recognition by the community of nations. 196 There are ready counterexamples to both theories: Transnistria, a territory in Moldova, seems
to meet the Montevideo criteria, but has been denied statehood by the
international community; 197 Palestine is recognized by more than 100
UN member states, but faces long odds to becoming a member in its
own right and may fail the Montevideo “government” test. 198
Under the declaratory theory, there exists an argument that the
Houthis have formed a state as defined by the Montevideo Convention.
While acknowledging that state recognition or non-recognition often
comes down to political calculations, 199 the remainder of this section
applies the Montevideo rules to the Houthis.
1. Permanent population and defined territory: The requirement
of a permanent population is generally not considered burdensome.
There is no minimum threshold, nor does the population need to be
fixed provided that it identifies with the region of control. 200 Nor must
the putative state’s territory be strictly defined. Borders may remain
uncertain or disputed as long as the NSA retains effective control over

193. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 3, Dec.
12, 1933, 165 U.N.T.S. 21.
194. Robert J. Delahunty, Statehood and the Third Geneva Convention, 46
VA. J. INT’L L. 131, 142 (2005).
195. Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and Internal SelfDetermination: A Right of Newly Seceded Peoples to Democracy?, 34
ARIZ. J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L. 1, 20 n.66 (2017).
196. Delahunty, supra note 194, at 142.
197. Anderson, supra note 195, at 19–20.
198. Joshua Berzak, The Palestinian Bid for Statehood: Its Repercussions for
Business and International Law, 12 J. INT’L BUS. L. 89, 96–98, 101–04
(2013).
199. Joshua Downer, Towards a Declaratory School of
Recognition, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 581, 583 (2013).

Government

200. Eli Bernstein, Is the Islamic State a “State” in International Law?
OF
WESTERN
AUSTRALIA
(Nov.
18,
2015),
UNIVERSITY
https://casetext.com/analysis/is-the-islamic-state-a-state-ininternational-law [https://perma.cc/Y6BR-NBPD]; Amichai Cohen,
Yuval Shany, & Tal Mimran, ISIS: Is the Islamic State Really a State?
ISRAEL
DEMOCRACY
INSTITUTE
(Sept.
14,
2014),
THE
https://en.idi.org.il/articles/5219[https://perma.cc/CT97-RZ39];
Michael Anderson, Reconceptualizing Aggression, 60 DUKE L. J. 411, 423–
24 (2010).
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a consistent region. 201 Once established, statehood is not extinguished
by subsequent territorial losses or foreign occupation. 202
From their base in Saada governorate to the other northern
territories into which they have expanded during the course of the war,
the Houthis control a large swath of Yemen’s land mass and population.
While the frontlines continue to shift, the Houthis’ grip on Sana’a and
other northern strongholds has hardly slipped since the onset of the
conflict. Millions are living under their rule across at least half of
Yemen’s governorates. 203
2. Effective and independent government: While the Montevideo
Convention includes no such qualifiers, the third criterion is often
rendered as an effective and independent government. 204 That is, a
government which, regardless of its form, capably and exclusively
exercises the functions of a state within its territory, including the
enforcement of law and order. 205 This element is typically considered
the most salient factor in the Montevideo analysis. 206
Since ejecting the Yemeni armed forces from Saada in 2011, the
Houthis have erected an elaborate governance infrastructure by
capturing existing state institutions and co-opting personnel. 207 Led by
an executive body called the Supreme Political Council, the Houthis’
Sana’a-based National Salvation Government has announced bold
government programs. 208 It collects import taxes, 209 operates a judicial

201. Bernstein, supra note 200; Cohen et al., supra note 200; Anderson, supra
note 200, at 423.
202. Bernstein, supra note 200; Rᴇsᴛᴀᴛᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ (Tʜɪʀᴅ) ᴏF Fᴏʀᴇɪɢɴ Rᴇʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴs Lᴀᴡ
ᴏF ᴛʜᴇ Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs § 201 cmt. b (Aᴍ. Lᴀᴡ Iɴsᴛ. 1987).
203. See Interactive Map of Yemen War, LIVE UNIVERSAL AWARENESS MAP
(June 5, 2019), https://yemen.liveuamap.com[https://perma.cc/C276ZQ6Y].
204. See Bernstein, supra note 200; Cohen et al., supra note 200; Anderson,
supra note 200, at 422.
205. See Bernstein, supra note 200; Cohen et al., supra note 200.
206. See Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 402 F.3d 274, 288 (1st
Cir. 2005).
207. See Michael Knights, The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to
State Capture, 11 CTC SENTINEL 15, 17 (2018).
208. See Ahmed Abdulkareem, Yemen’s Houthi Movement Unveils “National
Vision” to Heal, Rebuild, and Modernize Their War-Torn Nation, MINT
PRESS NEWS (May 7, 2019), at https://www.mintpressnews.com/houthimovement-unveils-new-national-vision-heal-rebuild-modernizeyemen/258274/[https://perma.cc/8UB9-R5W5].
209. See Elana DeLozier, In Damning Report, UN Panel Details War Economy
in Yemen, THE WASHINGTON INST. FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (Jan. 25,
2019),
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/in-
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system, 210 and enjoys the protection of a sophisticated military and
intelligence apparatus. 211
3. Capacity to enter into relations with the other states: The ability
to conduct foreign relations is considered to be the least important
among the Montevideo factors. 212 To meet this standard, an aspiring
state need not actually engage in diplomatic relations (which, according
to international law, are founded upon mutual consent 213); it merely
must possess the technical, political, and financial capability to do so.214
Through their cultivation of close ties to Iran (including the
appointment of an ambassador) 215 and their engagement in the UN
peace process, 216 the Houthis have arguably proven this capacity.
***
Therefore, even if it were conceded that AOGs lack the requisite
legal personality to sign onto pledges that are inherently binding, there
may yet be cause to enforce those agreements under international law.
UNSC endorsement of an agreement has an unambiguously compulsory
effect on states, and most likely obliges AOGs to comply as well.
Accords focused on issues related to IHL – and perhaps even those that
extend beyond that realm – can be labeled special agreements under
damning-report-un-panel-details-war-economy-inyemen [https://perma.cc/8N2N-HHR2].
210. See Yemen: Mass Executions in Houthi Group Courts, EUROMEDITERRANEAN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR (May 5, 2018),
https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/2377/Yemen:-Mass-executionsin-Houthi-group-courts[https://perma.cc/YAB5-KRDQ].
211. Knights, supra note 207, at 17.
212. See Amichai Cohen, Yuval Shany, & Tal Mimran, ISIS: Is the Islamic
State Really a State? THE ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE (Sept. 14, 2014),
https://en.idi.org.il/articles/5219 [https://perma.cc/5RYD-H8BB].
213. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 2, Apr. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
214. See Rᴇsᴛᴀᴛᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ (Tʜɪʀᴅ) ᴏF Fᴏʀᴇɪɢɴ Rᴇʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴs Lᴀᴡ ᴏF ᴛʜᴇ Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs
§ 201 cmt. e (Aᴍ. Lᴀᴡ Iɴsᴛ. 1987); Amichai Cohen et al., supra note 200;
Eli Bernstein, supra note 200.
215. See Gerald M. Feierstein, Iran’s Role in Yemen and Prospects for Peace,
Tʜᴇ
Iʀᴀɴ
Pʀɪᴍᴇʀ
(Dec.
5,
2018),
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/dec/05/iran’s-role-yemen-andprospects-peace [https://perma.cc/3NUT-LWYK]; Mohammed Hatem,
Yemen Shiite Rebels Appoint an Ambassador to Iran for First Time,
Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ
(Aug.
18,
2019,
3:45
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-18/yemen-shiiterebels-appoint-an-ambassador-to-iran-for-first-time
[https://perma.cc/7B2L-QNGP].
216. See Osama Al-Rawhani, The Good and the Bad in the New Peace
JAZEERA
(Dec.
19,
2018),
Agreement
on
Yemen,
AL
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/good-bad-peace-agreementyemen-181218082222574.html[https://perma.cc/2ZMU-VKZF].
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the Geneva Conventions or the Hague Convention of 1954. And if the
AOG fulfills the Montevideo conditions of statehood, the agreement
might even be construed as a treaty under the VCLT.

IV. Strategies for Legalizing NIAC Peace Agreements
Perhaps aware of the murky legal waters, parties to NIACs have
adopted a variety of different techniques designed to craft agreements
with artificial legal gravitas. Broadly speaking, these legalization
tactics fall under three categories: (1) fashioning the agreement into a
contrived legal format, (2) using legalistic language and citing binding
sources of international law, and (3) incorporating external state parties
and international organizations as agents of legitimization. Drawing
upon the work of Christine Bell, this section assesses these strategies
and offers recommendations.
A.

Legal Form

Creative drafters can manipulate NIAC peace agreements into
established legal formats by: (1) formally structuring them as interstate
treaties, (2) designating them as constitutional frameworks, (3)
incorporating them into the democratic process, (4) casting them as
special agreements, or (5) following a sequencing template borrowed
from interstate treaties or UNSC practice.
1. Treaty Format: Ireland’s Belfast Agreement, Bosnia’s Dayton
Peace Accords (DPA), and Cambodia’s Paris Accords are all instances
of peace agreements resolving NIACs that have been drafted as treaties
between states. 217 In each case, states external to the conflict have
essentially acted as the guarantors of the AOGs involved, ensuring that
their non-state allies will both fulfill their commitments and receive the
benefits of their bargain. 218 Signatory states are legally bound to these
accords as they would be to any other treaty. In some cases, AOGs
sign onto companion agreements appended as annexes to the central
treaty. 219
217. See Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status,
100 Aᴍ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 373, 389 (2006). See generally Agreement Reached in
Multi-Party
Negotiations
(1998),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up
loads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MAF9-TKNR]; The General Framework for Peace in
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
(1995),
https://www.osce.org/bih/126173?download=true
[https://perma.cc/377W-GFN8]; U.N. Secretary-General, Framework for
a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, U.N. Doc.
A/46/608- S/23177 (Oct. 30, 1991).
218. See Bell, supra note 217, at 389.
219. See id. at 389–90.
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While they stand on firm legal footing, treaties of this ilk suffer
from several practical disadvantages.
Most obviously, their
effectiveness is wholly dependent upon the underwriter states’ ability
to compel the compliance of non-signatory AOGs. Similarly, it is the
states, rather than the AOGs, who bear the reputational costs of
noncompliance. 220 Recognizing the discontinuity between the parties to
the agreement and the parties to the conflict, peace-agreement treaties
often feature difficult-to-enforce calls for further negotiations in a
continuing peace process. 221
2. Constitutional Format: An alternative method of situating peace
agreements within a settled legal mode is to frame them as
constitutions. South Africa, for example, positioned its Interim
Constitution as the primary instrument embodying outcomes of the
peace process. 222 Constitutions were also components of Bosnia’s DPA,
Kosovo’s Rambouillet Accords, and Papua New Guinea’s Bougainville
Peace Agreement. 223 Integrating the terms of a peace agreement into a
new constitution anchors the arrangement in domestic law and offers
an opportunity for the state to chart a new future for itself.
But peace-agreement constitutions, too, have their drawbacks. The
adversarial nature of the negotiating process often precipitates
provisions more closely resembling the term sheet of a singular, private
transaction than the foundational and universal principles of a social
contract. 224
Relatedly, such constitutions are often explicitly
transitional rather than permanent. 225 Furthermore, the contentious
travaux préparatoires may cause constitutional interpretation, a
fraught enterprise in any context, to become especially politicized.226
Lastly, engaging in constitutional revision or replacement outside of the

220. See id. at 390.
221. See id. at 390–91.
222. See id. at 391. See generally S. AFʀ. Cᴏɴsᴛ., 1994.
223. See Bell, supra note 217, at 392; General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugoslavia, Nov. 30
1995, 7 Sᴜᴘᴘʟᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ Dᴇᴘ’ᴛ ᴏF Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ Dɪsᴘᴀᴛᴄʜ 1, 25 (1996); Permanent Rep.
of France to the U.N., Letter dated 4 June 1999 from the Permanent Rep.
of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. S/1999/648, annex, Rambouillet Accords (Jun. 7, 1999); Permanent
Rep. of Papua New Guinea to the U.N., Letter dated 22 October 2001
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/988, encl. II, Bougainville Peace Agreement
(Oct. 23, 2001).
224. See Bell, supra note 217, at 392.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 393.
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established amendment process may invite challenges to the document’s
legitimacy. 227
3. Incorporation into the Democratic Process: Rather than
assiduously molding a peace agreement into the shape of a constitution,
NIAC peace negotiators can curry democratic legitimacy through other
means. One available track is to incorporate the peace agreement into
the constitution by a constitutional amendment. Colombia’s final
peace agreement provided for the constitutional incorporation of certain
elements; 228 it was ultimately incorporated in its entirety. 229 Likewise,
South Sudan’s revitalized peace agreement established a National
Constitutional Amendment Committee to guide the integration of the
agreement into the transitional constitution. 230 Converting a peace
agreement into a constitutional amendment can etch it into domestic
law in a less disruptive manner than forging a new constitution.
Instead of amending the constitution, the legislature can also ratify
a NIAC peace agreement through legislation. 231 Along with the
constitutional track, the Colombian agreement included language
encouraging its legislative enactment, too. 232 Its congress formally
adopted the agreement within a week of its signing. 233 Similarly, the
legislatures of Sierra Leone and South Sudan passed ratifying legislation

227. See id. at 393–94.
228. Final Agreement to End Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting
Peace, Colom.-F.A.R.C., art. 6.1.9(b)–(c), Nov. 14, 2016, available at
http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacionarmas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8V2-9M34].
229. See L. 50.230, Mayo 11, 2017, D.O. (Colom.). See generally Courte
Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], Octubre 11, 2017, Sentencia
C-630/17 (Colom.) (upholding and clarifying the amendment).
230. See Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic
of South Sudan art. 1.1, Sept. 12, 2018, available at
http://ctsamm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/R-ARCSS-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T5DB-Q8D3].
231. See Gregory H. Fox, Kristen E. Boone & Isaac Jenkins, The Contributions
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions to the Law of NonInternational Armed Conflict: New Evidence of Customary International
Law, 67 Aᴍ. U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 649, 713 (2018).
232. Final Agreement to End Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting
Peace, Colom.-F.A.R.C., art 6.1.9 Nov. 14, 2016, available at
http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacionarmas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8V2-9M34].
233. See Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, Columbia’s Congress Approves
Historic Peace Deal with FARC Rebels, Wᴀsʜ. Pᴏsᴛ (Nov. 30, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombiancongress-approves-historic-peace-deal/2016/11/30/9b2fda92-b5a7-11e6939c-91749443c5e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/7AQJ-KM88].
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with respect to their own NIAC peace agreements. 234 Ratification not
only welcomes a NIAC peace agreement into the domestic legal
framework, it makes it procedurally look like an international treaty.
Lastly, some NIAC peace agreements have been put to public
referendum. The overwhelming majorities in Ireland and Northern
Ireland that voted in favor of the Belfast Agreement in 1999 have since
been cited as proof of popular will opposing any measures to undermine
it. 235 Colombia, on the other hand, represents a notable failure of the
referendum option, with a narrow majority of voters rejecting the
deal. 236 The contrast between these two cases illustrate the risks and
rewards of a public vote. While allowing for broader democratic
engagement, referenda can also result in polarizing rhetoric, deepened
societal divisions, and a refusal to accept the outcome. 237
4. Special Agreement Format: Peace agreements can constitute
special agreements so long as they “bring into existence further
obligations drawn from the Geneva Conventions and/or their
Additional Protocols.” 238 Status as a special agreement might not make
the entire agreement between a state and an AOG legally binding, but
it arguably obligates the parties to at least adhere to the terms of the
agreement related to the Geneva Conventions. 239 If nothing else, stating
explicitly within a peace agreement that it is a special agreement under
234. Chargé d’affaires ad interim, Letter dated 12 July 1999 from the Chargé
d’affaires ad interim of the Permanent Mission of Togo to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/777 (July 12, 1999) (explaining Sierra Leone’s use of the
legislative tool); Press Release, Sudan Tribune, South Sudanese
Parliament Ratifies Peace Agreement with SPLM-IO (Sept. 10, 2015)
(explaining South Sudan’s use of the legislative tool).
235. Marie O’Halloran, Respect Irish Vote on Belfast Agreement, Taoiseach
IRISH
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2018),
Tells
Brexiteers,
THE
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/oireachtas/respect-irish-voteon-belfast-agreement-taoiseach-tells-brexiteers-1.3409232
[https://perma.cc/JT8Y-MDSS].
236. See Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject Farc Peace Deal, BBC (Oct. 3,
2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america37537252 [https://perma.cc/9UL8-2W76].
237. See Jack Stuart, Bougainville: Is the Delayed Independence Referendum
a Step Toward Peace? U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://www.usip.org/blog/2019/03/bougainville-delayed-independencereferendum-next-step-toward-peace [https://perma.cc/Z8JG-GQBY].
238. Commentary of 2016, Article 3: Conflicts of an International Character,
no. 850, (construing Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field).
239. See Ezequiel Heffes & Marcos D. Kotlik, Special Agreements as a Means
of Enhancing Compliance with IHL in Non-International Armed
Conflicts: An Inquiry into the Governing Legal Regime, 96 Iɴᴛ’ʟ Rᴇᴠ. ᴏF
ᴛʜᴇ Rᴇᴅ Cʀᴏss 1195, 1211–12, 1223 (2014).
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Common Article 3 at least lodges it within the international legal realm
and offers an opportunity for a review of its compliance with IHL. 240
5. Agreements Pursuant to UNSC Mandates for Peacebuilding: As
noted above, the UNSC unequivocally considers NIAC peace
agreements to be legally binding. At times, it takes charge of the peace
process itself by issuing a resolution articulating guiding principles and
sketching a roadmap for future discussions. All subsequent agreements
reached within this framework are implicitly graced by the UNSC’s
binding imprimatur. The peace processes in Afghanistan, 241 East
Timor, 242 Kosovo, 243 and Syria 244 have all proceeded under this form of
UNSC stewardship. Typical milestones on this pathway include
forming a transitional government, conducting elections, and reforming
the constitution. 245
B.

Legal Drafting

1. Legalistic Language: Regardless of their form, peace agreements
cultivate authority by couching their terms in legal stylization. By
using precise and compulsory language to delineate an interlocking
network of reciprocal commitments, they assume a contractual tenor.246
This legalistic tone, in turn, amplifies their “compliance pull,” or
perceived legitimacy. 247 Research in fact suggests a positive correlation
between an agreement’s specificity and its durability. 248
Precision is most attainable with respect to short-term conflictresolution measures, such as ceasefire, demobilization, and
demilitarization plans. 249 It becomes less practical when it comes to
long-term legal reform and constitutionalization, forcing agreements to
instead introduce a set of more vaguely stated principles and processes
to guide future developments. 250 This, too, can bolster compliance in
240. See id. at 1196.
241. See S.C. Res. 1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
242. See S.C. Res. 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
243. See S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999).
244. See S.C. Res. 2254 (Dec. 18, 2015).
245. See e.g. Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status,
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 373, 391 (2006).
246. See id. at 396–97.
247. Id. at 395, quoting Thomas M. Franck, Tʜᴇ Pᴏᴡᴇʀ ᴏF Lᴇɢɪᴛɪᴍᴀᴄʏ Aᴍᴏɴɢ
Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴs 46 (1990).
248. See Virginia Page Fortna, Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the
Durability of Peace, 57 INT’L ORG. 337, 362 (2003).
249. See Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status,
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 373, 396 (2006).
250. See id. at 397–98.
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its own way by enabling broader civic participation in the ongoing
peacebuilding endeavors. 251
2. Incorporating International Law that is Binding on Each Party:
Another method for increasing the likelihood that peace agreements
with AOGs will be deemed enforceable by the international community
is to incorporate sources of international law that supports their clauses.
Peace and political agreements have cited to all of the sources of
international law discussed above that impute legal responsibility on
AOGs, including the Geneva Conventions, 252 UN Security Council
Resolutions, 253 international human rights law, 254 and the UN
Charter. 255 By showing that its provisions are consistent with or
required by international law, an agreement may situate itself in the
international legal realm and create an international legal framework
by which non-compliance can be judged.
3. Setting Implementation Milestones: A third way to legalize an
agreement between a state and an AOG is to detail the stages of its
implementation. Listing requirements for how an agreement must be
251. See id. at 399.
252. See, e.g., SPLM-United/Operation Lifeline Sudan Agreement on Ground
Rules, Sudan, Jan. 5, 1996 (expresses support for the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and the 1877 Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions).
253. See, e.g., Global and Inclusive Political Agreement of the Interdiocesan
Center of Kinsasha, Dem. Rep. Congo Dec. 31, 2016 (“Whereas this
pursuit of inclusivity must be done in accord with the Constitution of the
DRC, the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations Security Council,
particularly Resolution 2277”); Gali Protocol of 8th October 2003 on
Reducing the Tension and Improving the Mechanisms for Security in the
Conflict Zone, Oct. 8, 2003 (“…underlining the importance of the
resolutions by the Security Council of the UN”).
254. See, e.g., Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the
Justice and Equality Movement-Sudan, Feb. 10, 2013 (“Determined to
respect all international conventions, charters, resolutions, and protocols
ratified by Sudan . . . .”); Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict
and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, Nov. 24, 2016 (“. . . . the parties,
always and at every stage, have upheld the spirit and scope of the rules
of the National Constitution, the principles of international law,
international human rights law, international humanitarian law (its
conventions and protocols), the stipulations of the Rome Statute
(international criminal law), the decisions of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights concerning conflicts and conflict termination, and other
resolutions of universally recognised jurisdictions and authoritative
pronouncements relating to the subject matters agreed upon . . . .”).
255. See, e.g., Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the
Justice and Equality Movement-Sudan, Feb. 10, 2013 (“In accordance
with the United Nations Charter and principles…”); Final Agreement to
End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, Nov. 24,
2016 (“The state has the autonomy to establish special jurisdictions or
legal systems, deriving from the provisions of the UN Charter . . . .”).
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activated serves as a type of deliverable, reminiscent of clauses in a
contract in domestic law.
Some peace agreements contain
implementation schedules, 256 and some even assign who is responsible
for the implementation itself 257 and for its oversight. 258 While detailing
specific milestones does not make an agreement more legally binding,
it does provide a metric by which compliance with the peace agreement
can be judged. Moreover, drafters can enhance the legal quality of their
handicraft, at least superficially, by borrowing from the frameworks of
UNSC-driven plans. Even if not proceeding pursuant to a blueprint
drawn up by the UNSC itself, drafters of NIAC peace agreements could
incorporate similar milestones to support an argument that their
agreements should be afforded similar legal weight.
C.

Third-Party Involvement

A defining trait of legal documents is the participation of third
parties at particular phases of their lifetimes. 259
NIAC peace
agreements follow this formula religiously, trading freely on the
legitimacy of international organizations and external states by inviting
their inclusion in the deal’s various stages. Specifically, international
third parties commonly engage in NIAC peace agreements through
mediation and countersignature, implementation and monitoring
assistance, and dispute resolution and enforcement.
1. Mediation and Signature:
Foreign states, international
organizations, or international NGOs are frequently called in to serve

256. See, e.g., Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable
and Lasting Peace, Nov. 24, 2016; Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Accord for Burundi, Aug. 28, 2000; Comprehensive Peace Agreement
between Government of Liberia and LURD, MODEL, and the Political
Parties Aug. 18, 2003; Peace Agreement Between the Government of
Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7,
1999.
257. See, e.g., Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and
the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999.
258. See, e.g., Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire art. 4.12, UgandaLRA/M,
Feb.
23,
2008
(Uganda,
2008),
available
at
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/lra-gu-ceasefire.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YY7P-9PJQ] (stating that the responsibilities of the
monitoring team shall include “(a) taking full responsibility for the
management of the Assembly Area; (b) monitoring the implementation of
this Agreement; (c) amicable resolution of any disagreement arising out
of the implementation or interpretation of this Agreement; (d) analyzing
and reporting events and trends to the Mediator, who will brief the Parties
accordingly . . . .”).
259. Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100
AM. J. INT’L L. 373, 385 (2006), citing Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000).
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as mediators to facilitate negotiations between parties to a NIAC.260
When the agreement is formalized, they may subsequently be asked to
sign on as witnesses, guarantors, or observers. 261
International
participation and approval at this early stage signals the agreement’s
internalization of accepted global norms. 262 In addition, it heightens
the compliance pull by making the obligations multilateral rather than
merely bilateral. 263
2. Implementation and Monitoring Assistance: International actors
may execute a variety of different implementation tasks at the request
of the contracting parties. 264
International organizations with
recognized expertise may supervise discrete operations within their
competencies: the UN High Commissioner for Refugees commonly
manages the return of refugees and displaced persons; the International
Committee of the Red Cross oversees prisoner exchanges; a number of
different organizations may be charged with elections monitoring.265
There are also opportunities for long-term international participation
in more gradual state-building processes, including legal and
institutional reform, national reconciliation, and civil society
development. 266
In addition to actively supporting implementation procedures,
international organizations may be further called upon to verify the
parties’ compliance with the agreement or specific parts of it.267
Agreements can establish monitoring or implementation commissions
comprised of international organizations or actors to document and
evaluate adherence to the peace agreement or to provide logistical
support or expertise. 268
260. Christine Bell, supra note 259, at 400; Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
Legal Dimensions of Peace Agreements in Internal Conflicts (July 2016).
261. Christine Bell, supra note 259, at 400; Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
supra note 260.
262. Christine Bell, supra note 259, at 401.
263. Id. at 401–02.
264. See, e.g., Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of
Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and
Political Parties art. IV(5) (2003) (“The Parties to this Agreement call
on the ISF to remain in place until otherwise determined by the UN
Security Council and the elected Government of Liberia”).
265. Christine Bell, supra note 259, at 403.
266. Christine Bell, supra note 259, at 404.
267. See Foreign & Commonwealth Office, supra note 261.
268. Jane Boulden, The Verification and Monitoring of Peace Accord,
Disarmament
Forum,
July
2000,
at
45,
available
at
https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/peacekeeping-evolutionor-extinction-en-362.pdf [https://perma.cc/44YV-V9MZ]. See, e.g.,
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3. Dispute Resolution and Enforcement: Just as domestic contracts
may be enforced in national courts, international agreements may be
submitted before a range of impartial, third-party dispute-resolution
mechanisms. The aforementioned Abyei agreement reflects a general
trend of referring disagreements arising under NIAC peace agreements
to international arbitration. 269 As the Abyei panel itself noted, the
NIAC parties’ choice of an international adjudicative tribunal signals
an intent to be governed by international law.270
NIAC peace agreements may further rely on international actors
for their enforcement. Most visibly, they may request an international
military presence to guarantee compliance. 271 Alternatively, they may
seek UNSC endorsement, 272 knowing that it comes with the threat of
sanctions against transgressors. 273 State parties soliciting UNSC
endorsement may bring an agreement to the attention of the Council
by requesting a referral from the Secretary-General. 274 In addition,
some UNSC endorsement resolutions have taken notice of joint
declarations released by heads of states affirming their support for the
subject NIAC peace agreement. 275
General Peace Agreement for Mozambique Protocol I, art. 5, Oct. 4, 1992;
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi Protocol II art.
13, 20 & Protocol V art. 3, Aug. 28, 2000; Peace Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone annex, Nov. 1, 1996; ECOWAS Six-Month
Peace Plan for Sierra Leone 23 October 1997–22 April 1998 Preamble
Para. 2, art. 1–4, 7, Oct. 23, 1997; Lusaka Protocol Annex 8, Nov. 15,
1994; Cotonou Agreement art. 3, 12, July 25, 1993.
269. Christine Bell, supra note 259, at 402; Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
supra note 261.
270. Liberation Movement/Army on Delimiting Abyei Area, Final Award, at
154 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/698
[https://perma.cc/X2GU-CZ56].
271. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, supra note 261.
272. Id. at 3.
273. See Final Agreement to End Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and
Lasting Peace Preamble, supra note 57.
274. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 29 March 2017 from the SecretaryGeneral addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2017/272
(Apr.
21,
2017),
available
at
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1710911.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8RPN-J32D]; U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 5
December 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of
the Security Council, S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001), available at
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D274E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20S2001%201154.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E535-NS7U].
275. S.C. Res. 1464, ¶ 1 (Feb. 4, 2003); S.C. Res. 2202, ¶ 1(Feb. 17, 2015).
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4. Publicizing an Agreement’s Terms:
Informing relevant
stakeholders – including the general public and international
community – of each party’s obligations under a peace agreement
makes it more difficult for a party to misrepresent or avoid its
obligations. Peace agreements can include specific provisions requiring
this communication to help ensure accountability for compliance with
their terms. 276

Conclusion
The legal status of NIAC peace agreements is a matter that remains
unresolved. While it is clear that AOGs may attain international legal
personality in some contexts, authoritative sources of interpretation
have not reached a consensus with respect to their capacity to create
contracts. In Part I, this Article reviewed the controversy over AOG
treaty-making power and the split within the courts on the issue. In
Part II, it illustrated the many different areas of international law under
which AOGs are held to possess legal personality, suggesting that they
could be able to accede to binding treaties. Part III showed that even
if AOGs cannot ordinarily enter into treaties of their own right, there
are other theories that support enforcing certain agreements that they
sign. Finally, Part IV recounted some of the strategies that NIAC
parties have innovated to bootstrap their pacts into binding documents.
How these efforts are evaluated in the future will have implications that
range from the odds of compliance with NIAC peace agreements to the
nature of statehood in international law.

276. See e.g., The Lomé Agreement: Peace Agreement Between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone
art.
XX
(July
7,
1999),
available
at
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/The_Lome_Pea
ce_Agreement-_1999_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSG2-GSR7] (“Each
party shall ensure that the terms of the present Agreement, and written
orders requiring compliance, are immediately communicated to all of its
forces.”); see also Cotonou Agreement art. 9(3) (July 25, 1993), available
at
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LR_930725_
CotonouAgreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y88D-VJH3] (“It is agreed by
the Parties hereto that each party shall immediately commence a
community information or educational programme, explaining to the
public be means of communication devices or any form of media, the
essence and purpose of the cease-fire, encampment, disarmament and
demobilization.”).
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